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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Conflict of Laws-Domicile Rule in Custody Proceedings
While the whole field of custody of the children seems to be confused, that area of the problem which crosses into the domain of Conflict of Laws is an entangled mass of inconsistent awards, decrees, and
orders.1 This lack of uniformity has given rise to abuses of custody
orders which not only go unreproved, but far too often result in advantage to the recalcitrant. The most prevalent of such violations
are withholding of a child against the wishes of his custodian and abducting of a child from the custodian by a parent or relative. How and
why such conduct is resorted to and often rendered advantageous in
subsequent custody actions can best be understood by considering the
jurisdictional aspects of such actions.
This subject presented no problem to the early common law for in
that system a father had absolute authority over his family. In America,
however, the state stands in the relation of parens patriae to its children.
In this capacity the sovereign's right is superior to that of the child's
parents, and this authority has as its natural corollary a duty to attend
the welfare and best interests of its minors. An incident of this obligation is the determination of custody of those children whose parents are
separated, divorced, deceased, or who by some unsocial conduct have
lost the right to their child. While legislatures enact some child welfare
regulations, the individual nature of the responsibility renders the ultimate resolution a matter for judicial discretion. Though broad range
is essential in the matter of deciding the specific issues, as in all judicious
actions some jurisdictional bounds must be defined.
A court determination of custody, being an adjucation of the do2
mestic status of the child is considered to be an in rem proceeding
Following the general rule of in rem proceedings as it is applied to
property and divorce actions, the res must be within the territorial dominion of the court for jurisdiction to attach. Thus, in divorce actions,
the res is said to be the marital status, and in most states one or both
of the parties to the suit must be domiciled in the forum in order to
3
In a custody action, the child is conbring the res into the state
4
sidered the res, but the action differs from other in rem proceedings in
that the foremost purpose must be the determination of what course is
1See Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. CrI. L.
REV. 42, 59 (1940).
' Coble v. Coble, 229 N. C. 81, 84, 47 S. E. 2d 798, 800 (1948) (dictum);
Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits, 7 CORNLL L. Q. 1 (1921). But
see Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Coaflict of Laws, 8 U. CL. L. REv.
42, 56 (1940).
GOODRICH, CONmICT OF LAws § 132 (3d ed. 1949).
'Coble v. Coble, 229 N. C. 81, 84, 47 S. E. 2d 798, 800 (1948)

(dictum).
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in the best interests of the child, and not the settlement of the rights
of two conflicting parties. 5
Because custody actions adjudicate status, domicile of the child as
well as his presence within the geographic bounds of the court's authority is essential to give jurisdiction in the majority of the states,0 and
this has generally been considered the rule in North Carolina. 7
The minor cannot have domicile apart from that of his parent,
guardian, or legal custodian. While living with his parents, the child's
domicile is that of his father. Following the common law rule of the
absolute authority of a father over his children, some states hold that
upon separation of the parents the child's domicile continues to be that
of his father until a custody award is made, even if the child lives with
his mother. Other states allowing a married woman living apart from
her husband separate domicile, and giving the parents equal rights to
the child, hold that upon separation of the parents, the child takes
the domicile of the parent with whom he lives.8
The domiciliary state is presumed to have the greatest interest in
the welfare of its citizens and therefore to give the utmost deliberation
to providing for its own incompetents. This forms a policy basis for the
rule requiring domicile as well as physical presence to give a court
jurisdiction in a custody case. Two well known authorities' set out domicile as a prerequisite to jurisdiction. The Restatement ° supports
the view that the child's domiciliary state has greater power than other
states and thus may change a foreign custody award. But domicile
of the child in the jurisdiction of the forum is not requisite for every
purpose: "In any state into which the child comes, upon proof that
the custodian is unfit to have control of the child, the child may be
taken from him and given while in the state to another person.... This
action will be effective within the state. If the state is also the domicile
of the. child, the action will change the status and will therefore be
effective in every state."' 1
Another leading authority 12 has suggested that the welfare of the

I Stumberg,

The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. CHI. L.

REV. 42, 56 (1940).
62 BEALE, CONFLICT or LAws § 144.3 (1935) ; 67 C. J. S., Parent and Child
8 13 (1950).

'Richter v.Harmon, 243 N. C. 373, 90 S.E.2d 744 (1955) ; Hoskins v.Currin, 242 N. C.432, 88 S.E. 2d 288 (1955) ; Gafford v.Phelps, 235 N. C.218, 29
S. E. 2d 313 (1952) ; Allman v. Register, 233 N. C. 531, 64 S.E. 2d 861 (1951).
' GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS

§§

36-40 (3d ed. 1949).

' Ibid.; Beale, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 1 U. CHI. L.
REv. 13, 22 (1948), where this authority says: "Since custody of a child by one

parent carries with it domicile and domestic status, jurisdiction to give the child
to one parent or the other depends in principle on the domicile of the child."
±RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1934).
11
1d. § 148.
12

Stumberg, The Staris of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. CHI. L.

REv. 42, 62 (1940).
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child being of foremost consideration, a legal technicality like domicile
should not be made the basis for jurisdiction. Because a minor cannot
establish domicile himself, it is felt that the rule fails if it is based on
a greater interest of the domiciliary court. Fear is expressed that a
child may suffer detriment at the hands of an undesirable custodian if
the court of the residence state cannot take jurisdiction.
While both domicile and physical presence of the child within the
state are required for jurisdiction in many states, a strong minority
group holds that physical presence alone is a valid basis for determination of custody. 13 Justice Cardozo considered the latter the proper
rule and gave voice to this view in Finlay v.Finlay.14 Mere domicile of
a child not in the state at the time of the action has been held a sufficient
basis for custody action jurisdiction in one or two scattered cases,'15 but
does not appear to be the consistent standard in any state. There are
a few opinions which have intimated that the presence of both parents
within the state would be reason enough for a court to entertain a
custody action, and that neither the child's presence nor domicile would
be necessary. 16
The full faith and credit clause of the United States ConstitutionY

is generally considered to prevent judgments and orders of the courts
of the various states from overlapping,' 8 yet the United States Supreme Court has given almost no indication as to how this clause should
apply to custody cases. Halvey v. Halvey 9 was the last Supreme Court
opinion on custody, and there the court based its decision on the narrow
conflict of laws rule 20 that a Florida judgment was only entitled to such
faith and credit by the New York court as Florida herself would
give her custody order.21 Many of the questionable areas were suggested
1

Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 41 N. W. 2d 60 (1950); In re Bort, 25
Kan. 308 (1881) ; Rogers v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 148 Atl. 524 (1930).
"1240N. Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E. 624, 625 (1925) : "The jurisdiction of a State to
regulate the custody of infants found within its territory does not depend upon the
domicile of the parents. It has its origin in the protection of the incompetent or
helpless."
"'
Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P. 2d 739 (1948).
1
Re Lee's Guardianship, 123 Cal. App. 2d 882, 267 P. 2d 847, 851 (1954)
(dictum).
17 U. S. CONsT., art. IV, § 1.
"8 Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S.215 (1905).
19330 U. S.610 (1947).
"In Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U. S. 610, 612 (1947) the court said that under
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 65.14 (1941) : ". .. decrees of Florida courts in divorce cases
fixing custody of children are ordinarily not res judicata either in Florida or elsewhere, except as to the facts before the court at the time of the decree."
I InHalvey v. Halvey, supra note 20 at 614 the court cited Rav. STAT. § 905
(1875), 28 U. S. C. § 1738 (1950) which "declared that judgments shall have such
faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have
by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken."
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by this case, but the court merely noted these issues and22 declined to

consider them as essential to the determination of the case.
The essential modifiability of the custody award is often given by
the courts as the reason for not being bound to full faith. 23 A judgment,
it is said, is not entitled to full faith and credit unless it is a final judgment. 24 An order is usually held to be binding and not subject to subsequent adjudication when a "full-dress-hearing" has been entertained
in a court of competent jurisdiction and an award has been made on
the issues before the court.25 The best interests of a child, however,
require that the custody award be redetermined upon show of subsequent change in circumstances rendering the former custodian incom26
petent.
"Change of conditions" is so broad a standard as to place almost
no restrictions upon the courts in treating foreign awards. Moreover,
the United States Supreme Court in the Hdvey case apparently did not
feel that even evidence of such change was required for a redetermination of another state's award. In that case the father took the child
from Florida to New York the day before the divorce decree and attendant award of custody to the mother was handed down. The mother
promptly brought action in New York to recover the child. No finding
of change of circumstances by the New York court was held necessary
for it to make a different award of custody. Neither was the child's
27
domicile made an issue in this case. Perhaps, then, Mr., Justice Brewer
was right when he said the temporary nature of a custody decree pre28
vented it from being entitled to full faith and credit.
22 In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Rutledge suggests that once the child

returned to Florida, the disappointed mother would be able to secure another decree
nullifying that of the New York Court; that the father might then again abduct
the child and secure restoration of those rights in New York, setting up "an unseemly litigious competition between the states and their respective courts as well
as between parents. Sometime, somehow, there should be an end to litigation in
such matters." Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U. S. 610, 620 (1947).
2 See Boone v. Boone, 150 F. 2d 153, 156 (D. C. Cir. 1945).
" Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1 (1909); Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183
(1900).

2 See Beale, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 1 U. CHI. L.
Rxv. 13, 24 (1930): "When custody is awarded one parent by a court having

jurisdiction, the right of this parent will be recognized by other states. The facts
upon which the award was based have become res judicata and cannot be reexamined in the second state. But this estoppel extends only to conidtions which
existed at the time of the original decree; the second court may examine any facts
which have occurred since the original decree which throw light upon the fitness of
the parents to have custody of the child."
2 Rogers v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 441, 148 Alt. 524, 552 (1930).
2 Mr. Justice David Josiah Brewer of the Kansas Supreme Court, later of
United States
Supreme
re Bort,
25 Kan.Court.
308 (1881). The subsequent post held by the Justice
2

In

has been considered by some authorities to have given this case more recognition
than it is due. See Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws,
8 U. CHr. L. Rxv. 42, 58 (1940).
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The fact that no uniform requirements exist to govern jurisdiction
of custody matters practically amounts to "open season" for "child
snatching." After an award of custody is made by a court of competent jurisdiction in State A, the disappointed parent or relative may
without authority take the child from his custodian, carry him into State
20
B, and have the child's custody redetermined in the courts of State B.
Similarly, this lack of harmony also puts a parent's custodianship in
jeopardy if the child is allowed to visit the other parent or grandparents
in a state other than that which awarded the custody.30
Two recent North Carolina cases, Richter v. Harmons ' and Weddington v. Weddington,3 2 bring these abuses sharply into focus. In the
Richter Case, upon a divorce decree of the Florida court, the custody
of a four year old girl was awarded to the child's mother. Sometime
later, the mother notified the child's father, who was then living in North
Carolina, that he could take the child for a visit to his home. In offering
to allow the child to make the visit, the mother stipulated that the child
was to be returned to her as soon as she could find employment and
become settled in the Washington-Baltimore area. Later, upon the
mother's demand, the father refused to relinquished the child. The
33
mother then came to North Carolina and brought a special action in
the superior court to enforce the Florida custody award. That court
held the foreign decree was entitled to full faith and credit, and ordered
the father to surrender the little girl to her mother.
Upon appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
sister state's award was not entitled to such credit, and that the superior
court should examine the circumstances of the case and determine into
whose custody she should be placed. Apparently, the basis for the
court's decision was the fact that the child's state of domicile which
34
follows that of her legal custodian, the mother, had ceased to be Florida
and had become Maryland. 35 A point was made of the fact that a child
usually must be domiciled in North Carolina for the court to assume
jurisdiction in a custody proceeding.3 6 Yet this child had never been
2 Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 41 N. W. 2d 60 (1950) ; Ex Parte Heilman,
176 Kan. 5, 269 P. 2d 459 (1954); Commonwealth v. Schofield, 173 Pa. Super.
631, 98 A. 2d 437 (1953).
"Richer v. Harmon, 243 N. C. 373, 90 S.E. 2d 744 (1955); Goldsmith v.
Salkey, 131 Tex. 139, 112 S. W. 2d 165 (1943).
31243 N. C. 373, 90 S.E. 2d 744 (1955).
S2243 N. C. 702, 92 S.E. 2d 71 (1956).

C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13 (1950).
'IN.
3
In re Alderman, 157 N. C. 507, 73 S. E. 126 (1911). This case has been
cited often as authority for the proposition that a prior court's custody award
has no binding force in a new state of domicile.
"0Cf. Lorenz v. Royer, 194 Ore. 355, 360, 241 P. 2d 142, 148 (1952); Re
Burns, 194 Wash. 293, 297, 77 P. 2d 1025, 1028 (1938).
"0See Allman v. Register 233 N. C. 531, 533, 64 S. E. 2d 861, 862 (1951):
"The validity of the [prior foreign] judgment . . . depends on whether the children
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in her domiciliary state of Maryland and subject to the jurisdiction of its
courts, and in addition both parents were before the North Carolina
court; therefore, it was held proper that jurisdiction should be assumed
and a redetermination of custody made. Thus by refusing to comply
with the Florida court's order the father gained a redetermination of the
37
child's custody.
The Weddington Case is the most recent North Carolina decision
involving "parental kidnapping." Here the superior court, in a habeas
corpus action 38 brought upon separation, had awarded one of the two
children to each parent with stipulations for visitations at given intervals.
Later a divorce action was brought by the wife with no request for
determination of custody. Then she sent the child over whom she had
custody to visit the father. He did not return the child nor give any
notice of her whereabouts from June until September. The mother
located her child on a school yard in South Carolina and brought her
back to North Carolina. She then moved the superior court for a dedetermination of custody as part of the divorce action and the father was
served with notice of this motion. Three days later he bodily picked
the child up from her schoolroom and carried her back to South Carolina.39
The superior court again awarded the child to the mother and
ordered that she be returned immediately under penalty of contempt
proceedings. Upon appeal, the supreme court held that the lower court
was without jurisdiction to determine custody as the child was not within
40
the jurisdiction of the court.

If such noncompliance and attendant abuses are not rebuffed in the
subsequent custody actions, 4' is there not some legal recourse for this
unsocial conduct? Contempt proceedings are available, 42 but if the
involved herein were domiciled in North Carolina at the time this proceeding was
instituted .... [U]nless the children were domiciled in this state at such time,
the court below was without jurisdiction to award their custody. .. "
" Would it not have been a more orderly procedure for the court to uphold
the lower court's order on domiciliary grounds, remanding the child to her
mother? The father then could have petitioned the Maryland Court for a redetermination with the burden of proof of change of circumstances falling on him.
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 17-39 (1953).
' Quaere what the South Carolina courts would have done if the action had
been brought by the mother in that forum?
"0The habeas corpus award was said to become ineffective upon the instigation of divorce proceedings thus rendering the action brought not one of enforcement of a previous custody order but an action for a new determination as part
of the divorce action.
4' See Commonwealth v. Schofield, 173 Pa. Super. 631, 645, 98 A. 2d 437, 443
(1953): "The fact that the mother took the children from Florida without the
father's consent, and in violation of the decree of the Florida court is important
here only so far as it may have a bearing upon her fitness to be awarded their
custody."
4' State v. Keller, 36 N. M. 81, 8 P. 2d 786 (1932).
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abductor flees the state, as is most often the case, this action is of course
ineffective. Kidnaping statutes of some states have been construed
43
to allow a criminal action against the abducting parent or his agent.
Apparently, however, North Carolina's kidnaping laws have closed the
door on this remedy.44 Even where this action is available, when
"border hopping" is practiced, difficulties of extradition proceedings
render the law virtually unenforceable, especially where escape is made
to a state not allowing such action. The federal statute on kidnaping 45
expressly excludes abduction by a parent.
At least one court4

has awarded damages for mental disturbance

to the parent or guardian from whom a child was illegally taken in a
custody fight. Apparently, this action has not been often used, probably
because many jurisdictions still adhere to the common law notion that
a loss of services of a child must be proved before a parent is entitled to
damages for the abduction of his child.4 7

With such meager remedies available, in the interest of the welfare
of our children, the courts should refuse to entertain custody actions
when a child's presence within the state is a result of wrongful conduct

of one of the parties to the action.48 The jurisdictional requirement of
domicile of the child, in comparison with residence or presence alone,
substantially reduces the benefits which are available to the abductor
and withholder. The domicile rule is not suggested as a "cure-all" for

custody abuses, 49 but until the United States Supreme Court speaks, or
" Lee v.People, 53 Colo. 507, 127 Pac. 1023 (1912) ; State v. Taylor, 125 Kan.
594, 264 Pac. 1090 (1928) ; Commonwealth v. Bresnahan, 255 Mass. 144, 150 N.E.
882 (1926); 31 Am. JuR., Kidnapping § 6 (1940); 51 C. J. S., Kidnapping § 4
(1947).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-40 and 42 (1952) provide that no near blood relative
shall be indicted for abducting or conspiring to abduct a child.
1;62 STAT. 760 (1948), 18 U. S. C. § 1201 (1952), as amended, Pub. L. No.
983, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. S. (Aug. 6, 1956).
"Pickle
v. Page, 252 N. Y. 474, 169 N. E. 650 (1930).
'7 But see Howell v. Howell, 162 N. C. 283, 78 S.E. 22 (1913), where the
court held that in actions for abduction of infants no loss of service need be alleged
or proved.
" See Shippin v. Bailey, 303 Ky. 10, 14, 196 S.W. 2d 425, 427 (1946) where
the court said to adjudge custody would put the "stamp of judicial approval upon
the wrongful taking." Re Burns, 194 Wash. 293, 77 P. 2d 1025 (1938) is an
example of a case where the court refused to take jurisdiction when the child
was wrongfully detained in the state. See Taylor v. Jeter, 33 Ga. 195, 203 (1862) :
"Shall the courts of Georgia avail themselves of a tort to wrest from those of a
sister state a jurisdiction properly appertaining to them? We say not: rather
let the subject be remanded to them."
" See Ex Parte Heilman, 176 Kan. 5, 269 P. 2d 459 (1954), where custody
was awared the grandmother who abducted the child from California after the
California court had awarded custody to the mother. The court considered substantial changes (i.e., remarriage of the parents and subsequent reparting) before
disposing of the prior Kansas award. Here both states seemed to claim the child
as domiciliary. Cf. Evens v. Keller, 35 N. M. 659, 6 P. 2d 200 (1931). Neither
would the domicile rule effect the abuses of the Weddington Case.
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a conflict of laws rule evolves which shapes some jurisdictional contours
out of the custody tangle, retention of this rule appears to be the most
advisable course.
JOHN L. DAVIDSON
Constitutional Law-The Right to Government Employment for Those
Invoking the Fifth Amendment-Loyalty Oaths-Due Process
Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of New York City' again
brought before the United States Supreme Court one of the most controversial issues that has confronted our courts in recent years-the
right to continued government employment for those persons who have
not been charged with or convicted of any crime, 2 but whose government
service has been terminated3 because of security or loyalty reasons.
Specific examples have involved situations where: (a) the employee's
loyalty was questionable,4 (b) his status as a security risk made his
retention incompatible with the best interests of national security,5 (c)
1350 U. S. 551 (1956).

2"The charge of disloyalty or even of being a security risk has become in the
setting of today so serious that it is almost like a charge of a crime." Garrison,
Some Observations on the Loyalty-Security Program, 23 U. Cnr. L. REV. 1, 2
(1955).
'The cases before the Supreme Court on this point have challenged both state
and federal laws. Although the principles involved are similar, the federal and
state policies that have given rise to the cases have not been the same. The
federal government has established an elaborate and expensive system for investigating its employees, for conducting loyalty and security hearings and for
reviewing the results of these hearings. The states, if they have acted at all,
have tended to confine their loyalty measures to less expensive and more easily administered programs. Generally, with reference to those categories listed in the
text, those cases under a, b, and d have concerned federal employees and those
under c and e have concerned state employees. Both the federal and state cases
should be considered in a discussion pointed primarily at either line of decisions.
'Peters v. Hobby, 349 U. S. 331 (1955) ; Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U. S. 918,
(1951).
5 By virtue of Executive Order 10450 of April 27, 1953, the loyalty cases, which
were formerly categorized separately from the security risk cases, are merged with
and are known as security risks.
The criterion for dismissal as established under the first loyalty program was
"on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for the belief that the person involved is disloyal." Executive Order 9835 of March 21, 1947. This criterion was
changed to "reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved." Executive Order 10241 of April 28, 1951. Executive Order 10450 of April 27, 1953, made
the criterion "whether the ...

retention ...

is clearly consistent with the interests

of national security." This order provides standards and procedures for the exercise by agency heads of their power under the Summary Suspension Act, 64 STAT.
476, 1950, to summarily dismiss employees in the interests of national security and
establishes the criterion for dismissal as stated above. "There has thus been a
change from loyalty to security. At the present time, a person discharged as a
security risk may well be able to establish his unswerving loyalty. . . . Loyalty
cases as such no longer exist; a disloyal person is now dismissed as a security

risk." Sweeney, People, Government and Security: An Analysis of Three Books
and a Program. 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 79, 81 (1956).
Executive Order 10450 was held invalid to the extent that it authorizes an em-

